Holt and the establishment of arbitration: an Australian perspective by Macintyre, Stuart
NeH' Zealand journal of industrial ~elations, 1987, 12, 151-159 
Holt and th~e establi:shm~ent of arbitration: an 
Australian perspective 
Stuart Macintyre* 
"Even the argun1ent that New Zealand has done son1ething is not sufficient to satisfy rn.e of 
the co·rrectness oft he present n1oven1cnt.' The speaker \Vas Sir John Do\\'ncr. a delegate to the 
final session of the Australian Federal ~Convention :in 1898. The occasion was a debate on 
industrial arbitration, during \Vhich ~enthusiasts pointed repeatedly to the success of the Ne'"' 
Zealand Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of '1894. And the outcon1 ~e \\'as that by a 
narro\Vtnajority the Convention reversed its previous decisions and ·en1 powered the 'Con1n1on-
\\'ealth to n1ake la'\\'S for ·concil:iation and arbitration for the prevention and settlen1ent of 
industrial dispules extending beyond the lirnits of any one State.~ (Victorian ~Governnlent 
Printer. 1898. vol. I. p. 187) 
Sir John·s conservative pique is understandable. Ne\v Zealand precedents exercised a 
pervasive influence on Australian public affairs in the closing years ofthe nineteenth century. 
Fron1 tarning an obdurate upper house to busting up big estates. fron1 tax reforn1 to the 
enfranchise:n1ent of ·won1en~ the Ballance and Seddon n1inistrics furnished Australian pro-
gressives ~~ith a storehouse ofprecepls. When their opponents sough 1 to spike such argun1ents 
by distinguishing New Zealand's circun1stances fron1 Australia's, they were unwittingly con-
ceding the allure of the neighbouring colony: Ne\\f Zea:land \\'as a sn1aHcr. n1ore hon1ogcnous 
society with a surerc'lin1at.e and a less COlnpl·ex econon1y: or. as a Ne\v South Wales parliatnen-
tarian put it in 1900. in ·a simple little de:rnocracy' it \\'as ~easy to ·set up a little utopia·. (Chan. 
1971. p. 155) 
Of course the traffic across the Tasn1an \Vent in both directions. New Zealanders are 
perhaps n1ore a\vare than Australians of ·the n1ultiplicity of links bet\veen the Australasian 
colonies in the late nineteenth century: rnigration. investn1ent trade. overlapping labour n1ar-
kets. a shared cultural heritage and son1e con1n1on responses to their antipodean circu•n-
stances (Sinclair~ 1987). Nor is it surprising that the two countries should have learned fron1 
each other·s inititatives 'in pub'lic policy at this tin1e since they ·worked \\'ith parallel political 
insti'tut.ions and confronted broadly s:in1 :ilar challenges. l·heir prin1ary export sectors. which 
had brought rap·id growth by rnarrying foreign capital to rich natural resources. had reached 
the liinits of expansion within existing .rnethods and re'lations of production. The need to 
restore profitabilily and restructure the econon1ies provok~ed conflict between capital and 
labour tha'l threatened to shatter the social and political fabric. The connict \\'as concentrated 
in the key industries v.'here the stakes v.'ere highest and \\'·el'l-organ·ised groups of,enlployers 111et 
large con1binations of workers- for the V.'Orkforce employed in lhesc industries vlere the n1ost 
n1obile and best able to pool their conunon experience. The N·e\\' Zealand shearers· and 
n1iners~ unions both affiliated to their Australian counterparts in the late 1880s: and the fateful 
n1aritin1e strike of 1890, " 'hich triggered the turn to arbitration on both sides of the Tastnan. 
spread to Ne\v .Zealand in solidarity with Australian unionists. In sin1ilar fashion~ the archi-
tects of arbitration exchanged inforn1ation and ideas. 
Arbitration v.'as only one initiat.ive among n1any developed in response to the crisis. but it 
stands out both because of .its far-reaching effects and because it \\'as new and peculiar to these 
t'\\'0 countries. With justifiable pride, Pen1ber Reeves devoted the greater part of the second 
vol un1e of his Stateex:perilnents in Australia and Nelt' Zealand to the n1achinery he pioneered. No 
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British. An1erican or continental European account of the social laboratory of the south was 
con1plete \Vithout an appraisal of the arbitration systen1. 
It has been observed that the inhabitants of the United Kingdom and the United States are 
particularly prone to n1isunderstand each other because they labour under the fateful illusion 
that they speak the san1e language. It may welJ be the sarne with New Zealanders· and 
Australians· joint experience of arbitration. I have already observed that the two systems 
ernerged out of a comn1on predican1ent. The staten1ents of their progenitors reveal no signifi-
cant differences of approach or purpose. The rna chi nery~ the procedures. the very structure and 
language ofthe statutes that established arbitration, display a remarkable similarity. Neverthe-
less. there are reasons for circun1spection. 
To begin ~'ith. the tin1ing differ,ed significantly. New Zealand introduced its arbitration 
systern in 1894 '"'hen econon1ic recovery was under way. and speedily made the system 
effective. The Australian colonies ( fron1 1901. States) began more hesitantly in the 1890s while 
still suffering fron1 a contraction of .econon1ic activily- son1e settled for the less ambitious 
device of wage boards- and the central Commonwealth Arbitration Court est(!blished in 
1904. was circun1scribed by restrictions on the federal jurisdiction. Second. New Zealand and 
Australia took divergent paths in rebuilding their econornies. as the one intensified and the 
other rnodiJied the international division of labour. :Refrigeration allowed Ne'"' Zealand to 
develop ne\v export industries and enter a new phase of growth as prosperity flowed fron1 the 
farn1s and processing industries to the to\\'ns (Hawke. 1985. pp. 5-6). While Australia also 
diversified its farn1 production. greater attention was given to the protection and encourage-
nlent of secondary industry. The class configuration and poHtical balance of each country 
differed accordingly. In New Zealand the farn1ers n1atched the influence of the urban bourgeo-
isie. whereas in Australia they fanned a resent~ul a n1inority. In Australia the presence of an 
industrial \\'Orking class \vas unn1istakable. \vhereas in New Zealand. according to theMoari-
land JtJiorker in 1912. "if all the organised \VOrkers of New Zealand joined the Federation of 
Labor and decided to bring about the Revolution they couldn't do so. because they are only I 0 
per cent of the population·. ( Olssen. 1981. p. 271) The Australian labour n1oven1ent n1ight not 
have aspired to such heights but by 191 0~ \\'hen it enjoyed office federally and in three of the 
States. it clearly held the political initiative. New Zealand Labour had to wait until 1935 to fonn 
a governn1ent. 
It 1nay well be that the dotninion capitalist countries are locked into a cotnmon trajectory 
\Vhich. in the end. will frustrate their efforts to control their destiny within the world econon1y 
(Ehrensaft and Armstrong; 1981 ). Certainly the events of the past decade have seen both 
Australia and Ne\v Zealand abandon rnany of the distinctive devices through which they used 
to be'lieve that they could n1ould econornic Corces to national goals. But during the first part of 
the twentieth century it is apparent that the t~'O countries drifted apart as they en1barked on 
their different courses. Under these circun1stances it \\'Ould not he surprising if their con1n1on 
initiative .in the field of industrial arbitration developed along different 1 i nes and had different 
consequences. It is surely sign·ific.ant that after the initial flurry of inlerest had produced a 
su bstan tiall iterature on the industrial ex perin1ent in the A.ntipodcs. few scholars over the next 
tifty years con1pared their arbitration systen1s. 
Jan1es Holt's history of CotnpulsoiJl arbitration in New Zealand therefore has an augn1ented 
value for the Australian reader. First of all. it offers a clear and systcrnatic account of the 
establishn1ent and operation of the New Zealand systen1 for its first forty years. Second. it 
invit~es trans-Tasman con1parisons. There is no Australian equiva 'lent to Holt. though it is to be 
hoped that his exe1nplary general his tory \Vi'll encourage one. Even so. it is possible to set 
aspects oft he Australian experience against that ofNe\\' Zealand. and in the following page I 
hall concentrate on the forn1ative period. 
First there is the vexed question of origins. Vexed. because a dispute over paternity began 
even while the ink on the birth certificate \\'as still wet. The two n1eltleson1e claitnants were 
Pen1ber Reeves and the South Australian Charles Kingston. Both \Vere lawyers-turned-
politicians and advanced liberals who advocated arbitration in the aft·ermath of the 1890 
tnaritin1c strike. Both drafted bills after reviewing the available 'international precedents. 
Kingston late in 1890 and Reeves shortly afterwards. Holt notes that Reeves was sent a copy of 
Kingston's bill in March 1891 (it was in any case published as an appendix to the Report of the 
New South Wales Royal Con11nission on Strikes) but cred.its 'Reeves with being the ·principal 
author· of the New Zealand legislation (Holt., 1986. pp. 17. 24. 31 ). Here he follows Reeves· 
biographer. Keith Sinclair. \\'ho also acknowledged the debt Reeves owed to Kingston an1ong 
others. but judged that ~Reeves did n1uch oft he drafting hin1self oft he bill that he circulated in 
1891 (Sinclair. 1965. p. 151 ). 
The establishment of arbitration: an Australian perspective 153 
This judgcn1cn'l is ·based partly on circun1stantial evidence and part'ly on Reeves· own 
tcstirnony. but predontinantly it relies on a con1parison of the provisions of the South Austra-
lian and Nevl Zealand statutes (\vhich Reeves hin1self had conducted in State experin1ents in 
Australia and NeM' Zealand). Sinclair and Holt draw attention to the limitations and deficiencies 
of Kingston·s schen1e t.hat were overcon1e in the New Zealand version. Most oflhese compari-
sons. hovlever. rest on a confusion between Kingston's original b'ill and the statute that was 
linally enacted in heav·ily an1endcd fonn by lhe South Australian parlian1ent in 1894. In title. 
forn1. organisation and contents the original bill bears a close r~esen1h :lance to its New Zealand 
counterpart. A recent analysis of the provisions of the bill that Kingston presented for the first 
tin1e to the South Australian House ofAssen1hly on I~ Dece1n ber 1890 rcvea 'ls~ convincingly in 
rnyopinion, that it \Vas tiJ<e earliest version oft he classical forn1 of'the Australas·ian compulsory 
arbitration presented to any parliarnent (Mitchell 1987). Kingston c,ertainly thought so- on 
several occasions he expressed his rescntn1ent lhat Reeves had not properly acknowledged the 
fuJI ,exh::nt ofh·is obl·igation- and sotne historians have subsequently recognised his claim to 
paternity (Ko. 1926~ pp. 147-8: Portus. 1958" pp. 103-4~ Chan, 197L p. 53.: see also Spence, 1909. 
pp. 476-6~ Sutcliffe. 1967. p. 149). Reeves· principal achi~even1ent perhaps lay in the successful 
passage and in1plen1entation of the schen1e. for by the turn of the century it had become 
con1n1onplace, even in South Australia, for advocates of arbitration to refer to the 'New 
Zealand systen1 ,_ T'he last \\'Ork is best left \Vith A'lfred Deakin. \Vho. on this as on so many other 
occasions. found a fonnula to satisfy the honour of both parties. Speaking during the debate on 
the ConHnOn\\',ealth Conciliation and Arbit.ration Bill. and \vith the prickly Kingston sitting 
in1n1·cdiately behind hin1~ he put ·it thus: 
The New Zealand Bill. introduced in 1894. and n1odelled closely on the lines of the South 
Australian proposal. took a r11ore an1bitious flight. and, in happicrcircurnstances. achieved a 
greater success. It was an1cnded fron1tin1e to tin1e. untill900. when it\\ as consolidated. and 
nO\\ represenls what \\'ill ~dways remain one of the rnost rcn1arkable pieces of practica·l 
legislation which Austra'lia or any other counlry has ever witnessed. for\\ hkh M r Pen1ber 
Reeves deserves the highest honour (Conunonwealrh Parlian1entary Debates. '1903. p. 2866). 
If this adjudication of the paternily dispute is accepted. there are n1ore i:n1portant issues 
arising fron1 the establishn1,ent of arbitration that a con1parative perspective can help to 
e'lucidate. Tony Sin1pson ( 1987) observes that Holfs account of the origins of arb·itration in 
N,e\\' Zealand is restricted by its teleological approach Cit scen1s ... to ·en1erge as if fron1 a 
chrysalis") and the her:n1etic effect of its nan·ative structure ("no consistent pattern of n1eaning 
ernergcs fron1 it \\'hich relates ·it to the broader political scene'). The san1e difficulties bedevil 
existing Aus'traiian accounts of the creation of arbitration \\1i'thin a state or federal setting-
they too tell a story whose outcon1e is anticipated from the beginning. But \Vhenthe Australian 
and Ne\\' Zealand experiences are juxtaposed. neother the context nor the outcon1e can be so 
easily as un1ed: \Vhile a san1ple of one is d:ifficult to int.erpret. a second specin1en pern1its the 
identification of variables. Above alL a cotnparative approach :n1akes it poss:ible to pose two 
cornplen1cntary questions: why did these two countries, but not others. adopt this distinctive 
n1ethod of regulating industrial relations, and why '\\'as it adopted n1ore readily in the one than 
the other? 
Ho.lt"s opening chapter on "Origins· deals rather cursorily \Vith 'the explanations advanced 
by conternporaries Cor the innovation: 
St'likes and lockouts. they argued. were intolerable n1ethods of settling differences between 
cmp.loyers and employees. They ruined businesses and brought n1isery to Y.Orkingn1en and 
the·ir families. They imposed great burdens on innocent third parties. ~uch as workers in 
related industries. and consurners. They were a barbaric n1cthod for aduh n1en and won1en 
to settle their difference in civilised cou ntri,es (Holt. 1986. p. 15). 
Such claitns \Vere advanced in Australia as \Veil as New Zealand. but their intellectua'l 
provenance lay abroad in :the co-called ·new liberalism' that shifted the relationship between 
the stale and the citizen. Since the earlier liberalisJn that enshrined freedom fron1 state 
·interference had failed rnanifestly to solve probletns of poverty and inequality that threatened 
to poison public life. the ne\\' generation of liberals asserted the need for coU.ectivist measures 
that would enhance the capacity of citizens. These ideas took on a particular salience in 
Australia and Ne~ Zealand at the tin1e of the Maritin1e Strike, but I an1 not convinced that a 
single event even one of this n1agnitudc . explains such a radical departure. Rather, it is 
nccessasy to explain \Vhy the older liberalisn1. \\'ith its insistence that the state should leave 
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industrial relations to be resolved by free and responsible parties. hould have yielded so 
quickly to the ne\V liberalism \Vith its enlarged conception of state re. ponsibility. In Ne\\ 
Zealand lhe ease of this transition is especially striking. "(T)he right of private persons to 
n1anage lheir0\\'11 business without State interference ceases upon their conduct becon1ing an 
injustice to others or an inconvenience to the nation: (Reeves~ 1969, vol. 2. p. 165) With no trace 
of hesitation, Reeves tnoves here fron1 Milrs careful qualification of the frecdon1 of the 
individual to the loosest of formulations of a quite different consideration. the n1ere conven-
ience of a collective abstraction that he called the nation. 
So hO\V are we to explain such a ready acceptance of the new claitns? I would suggest that it 
sprang fron1 a particular configuration of circun1stances \\'ithin the historical experience of 
these \Vhite settler societies. After their recent and chastening n1isfortunes with world trading 
conditions. they had begun to restructure their prin1ary export sectors. But the don1estic 
sectors. \~lhich provided a livelihood for the n1ajority. r,en1ained highly sensitive to fluctuation 
in the volu1ne and price of the prin1ary export staples. The desire to stabilise the don1estic 
econo1ny and protect it fron1 sudden external shocks had political as \veil as econon1ic 
impulse . For in the absence of such correctives~ there was the prospect of recurrent contrac-
tions of ernployers and v.rage-earners and enden1ic political :instabi.lity. Since the settler ocie-
ties had long since opted for den1ocraLy. the pressure for state intervention \\'aS direct and 
in istcnt. There was already an extensive pattern of state involveinent in the colonia) econo-
n1ies through capital forn1ation. operation of pub'lic enlerprises and the provision of services. 
Furthern1ore. a quickening sense of national destiny fostered a \Vill ·ingness to fashion ne\\ 
institutions. 
Beyond the irnrnediate and avo\ved object of arbitration. to enforce industrial peace. there 
\\'ere far-reaching expectations and assurnptions about how arbitration would foster an en-
virontnent in \Vhich industrial peace \\'Ould be possible. As Holt observes. the Ne\V Zealand 
Arbitralio:n Act encouraged the fonnation of trade unions for precisely this reason: ~o too did 
the ubsequent Australian arbitration legislation (though not the V.'age board systen1. vlhich 
provided for direct representation of en1 players and ern ployees). The provision for union 
registration obviated the issue thal had occasioned the Maritin1e Strike in the first place and 
\VOttld ren1ain a n1ajor cause of industrial confliLt elsewhere - the refusal of etnployers to 
recognise and negotiate \Vith unions. And at the san1e tin1e that it gave recogn·ition to unions. 
arhitration in1posed an extensive control over their rules. procedures and the legitin1ate an1bit 
of their activitie ... 
l·he economic rationale of arbitration ·\\'as that it provided a n1echan isn1. as '\\'ell as a 
justification. for stabilising price and incon1e 1noven1enls as they spr,ead fron1 tht: relatively 
open to the relatively closed sectors of the colonial econon1ies. (Scherer. 1983) Another and 
equally fundan1ental aspect needs to be recognised. When liberals tackled the problcrn of 
adjusting public pol icy to the ne\\' econon1 ic circu n1sta nces. they were as 111 uch concerned \Vith 
the \Vider social consequences as they v.rere \Vith the 'il11111ediate problen1 of industrial unre t. 
Unen1ployn1ent and poverty, v.'age cuts. deskilling and the substitution offen1ale and juvenile 
labour for an ale labour- these \\'ere son1c ofthe rnanifestations of\\'hat becan1e known a •the 
social problen1'. Liberal and hun1anitarian reforn1ers \Vere incre,asingly aY.'nre that this social 
problt:t11 had its hasis in the COil11110dification of labour: they had no intention of preventing 
the buying and selling of htllnan labour-power. but they did \vant to in1pose lin1its on the 
Jabour n1arket that \VOuld check abu es and restore a proper harn1ony behveen tna ·tcr and 
man. As Sin1pson observes. there \Vas a close proxin1ity ·in Ne\\' Zealand bel\\'een the initial 
legi lative atten1pts to lin1 ·it hours of ernployinent regulate factory conditions. prohibit out-
\Vork n ncl check S\\'eati ng. and the subsequent adoption of arbitration . The sa n1e con ncction is 
apparent in Victoria \Vhere the creation ofv.'agc boards arose directly fron1 the rnanifest failure 
of earlier factory acts~ and in Tasn1ania \Vhere a royal con1rnission into sweating led again to 
the establisl1111ent of wage boards. Arbitration vias n1ore an1bitious in scope than the wage 
board approach. but it \Va also the n1ost effective and far-reaching response to the e concerns 
since it \\'ent directly lo the problen1 of regulating en1ployn1ent practices to safeguard and 
status and earning capacity of ma ~1e \\'age-earners (Macintyre~ 1985. chap. 3) 
1-Jolt says little of this aspect of arbitration but recent ferninist scholarship has stressed its 
in1portance in Australia. There are particular studies showing how arbitration served tore-
establish gender boundaries in the \VOrkplace and reinforce patriarchal authority (Ryan. 1984: 
Lee. 1987). More generally.. it has been argued lhat arb·ilration had lasting con .. equcnces 
because of the way it n1ade the wage the pivotal instrun1ent of social " 'elfare. Aner the living 
\vage bcca1ne the principal n1eans of rneeting the n1at,erial needs of the working-class fan1ily. 
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all other forn1s of public a~sistancc "ere designed a~ 1 in1 itcd and ~u pplcn1cntary n1casu rcs. l 'hc 
old-age pension cushioned the last year~ of those \\ho had retired fron1the '\\Orkforce: invalid 
pensions and v.orker·s cornpensation gave lin1ited prote~tion fron1 sickness or accident the 
n1atcrnity b~nelit n1et the additional ~expenscs incurred in ~hildhirth: son1 ~e n1easure of suste-
nance of charity was provided to the dependants of uncrnploycd \\orkers. But an of the~c 
n1easurcs were pren1iscd on the assun1ption that there was a rnal~ bread\\-'inner providing for 
the typical incorne unit an<.l the prin1ary object of Australian public po'licy up to the 1940s "'a~ 
to 'rnakc that assun1ption good (Macintyre. 19X6a). 
In surnrnary. the attraction of arbitration \\as that it n1etlhc particular needs of the settler 
socict 'ic~ in a \vay that v. as consish!nt \\ ith their cconon1ic ci rcu n1sta nces anti their politica I and 
social predilections. V.' hy. then. \\as the device accepted n1ore rcadil) in Nev. Zealand than in 
Australia'! On this question 1-lolt"s account ha!i particular interest for the Aus'lralian reader. 
The contrast is striking: Reeves· bill \\as introduced into parlian1cnt in .1X9:!. ~enacted in IH94. 
and fully operational by I R96- five years before the fir t Au~tralian Arbitration (~ourt opened 
its doors.l~he differ~.ncc in tin1ing reflects a <.liffcrence of political condilion~.ln Ne~ Zealand 
arbitration \\13!) lhe v.'ork of a Liberal n1inislry that enjoy,ed broad support. including the 
support of the trade unions~ accordingly. the Governn1ent was ahle to force the n1e.asure 
through the obstructionist upper house and then ren1ove its deficiencie~ by the speedy passag~ 
of anlending leg,islatjon as soon as they becarne apparent. In every one of these respect~ 
Australia differed: its established political parties v.'er~e already under challenge fron1 the 
Labor Party: its second chan1bcrs ren1aincd obdurate. and its cornparative lack of political 
stabilit.y n1,eant that there '" 'as seldon1 the opportunity to n1akc good the defects of the ear'ly 
tribunals. 
l .. he role of the Labor Party rcquir,es closer attention. The orthodox interpretation en1pha-
sises the labour n1oven1enCs support for arbitration. and pays particular attention to the 
leverage that the leverage that the infant Labor Party \\aS able to exert on the other partie 
through :its strategy of"support in return for concessions·. P.G. :Macarthy has given an innu-
ential exposition of this vic\\i: 
r~ ortuituosly .. party alignm~nts and personality rivalries enabled the ne\\ labour parties to 
exercise influence disproportionately to lheir nun1hcrs b) capitalising on their slralegic 
posi'lion in holding the balance of power in colonial. stah:: and con1n1onwcalth parlian1cnts 
I (Niacarthy. 1967a. p. 74). 
Purely on the Australian evidence. this explanation is open to challenge. It exaggerates 
hoth 'the con1n1itn1entto arbitration \\'ithin the labour n1oven1ent and the inOuence that the 
n1oven1cnt "ielded. These objections apply "• ith particular force in South Australia and 
Victoria. V.'herc Labor rcn1ained under the \\ing of the liberals until after the turn of lhe 
cent.ury: ·in Western Australia. ,,~ here arbitra'tion \vas enacted in 1900 before Lubor n1ade its 
parliarncntat)' debut: and in Tasrnania. where Labor still ren1ained a negligible force. ln Nev. 
South \Vales. Queensland and the Con1nlonv.'ealth, the tninin1un1 requirernents of the hypo-
thesis - an independent Labor Party '\Vith sign.ificant political strength - \v~ere at 'least 'in 
evidence. but even there its validity is still doubtfuL Labor held the balance of pO\\'er in Ne\\1 
South Wales fron1 I R91 but had to \\a it untill901 for a non-Labor adn1inistration to introduce 
con1pulsory arbitration. In Queensland the \vait \vas even n1ore protracted and the best that 
Labor could achieve until it \VOn office itself in 1915 " 'as \\'age boards. And in the Conlnlon-
" 'ealth parlian1ent the tYto non-Labor parties called Labor's blufL so that it " 'as a coalition 
drawn fro:n1 then1 both that fran1ed the rneasure finally adopted in 1904 (Macintyre .. 1987). 
My reading of the evidence i that v.~ hile Labor pressed for arbitration with increasing 
unanirnity and ardour fron1 the turn of the century. it \vas the non-Labor forces that iniliated 
the rneasure along lines and according to a tin1etabJ,e that they conlrolled. As in Ne\v Zealand. 
the n1ost an1 bitious schen1es \ver~e devised by liberal enthusiasts. The advent of Labor arguably 
" 'eakened. rather than assisted their efforts since it turned '\\'Orking-class n1cn1bers of parlia-
nl'ent V.'ho n1ighl othen~''ise have assisted then1 into political opponents and left a v.'eakened 
liberal run1p that was forced to take up an increasingly unsyrnpathetic stance. That is to say. 
insoCar as arbitration 'Was n1cant to rnediate class antagonisn1s in industry~ il was n1ore 'li:kely to 
\\tin acceptance where class antagonisn1s had not becon1c the organising principle ofpolitica'l 
life. I put fonvard this suggestion on the basis of the Nev.~ Zealand experience and there is sorne 
I ~hi~ interp.reta,t!?n (see. M a~arthy b.oito~1 of first page 1967 b: Rickard. 1976) supplanted the earlier 
\ tew of B~tan Ft.l~p.atnck -~hat ar?llralJon had been in1poscd on the \\Orkers b) cn1ployers and 
conservattve pohttc1ans (l·nzpatnck4 1941. pp. 228-9). 
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Australian evidence to support it In Victoria. vihere liberalisn1 was historically strong. the 
trade union established a United Liberal and Labor Party to contest the 1894 elections as an 
advanced v.ring of the rnains1rean1 Liberal n1ajority: it endor ed candidates both fron1 its own 
ranks and fron1 an1ongsytnpathetic Liberals. and 18 ofthen1 were successful. The unions \vere 
re\varded by the creation of the first \Vage boards ·in 1896~ but when they subsequently broke 
away to forn1 a separate Labor Party~ their call for arbitration went unanswered. 
The protracted gestation of arbitration and the circun1stances of its political contestation 
are thus thrO\\'n into bold relief by the New Zealand con1parison. But for an explanation of 
these contrasts \Ve need to go further. Bearing in n1ind the argun1ent n1ade earlier about the 
social and econon1ic aspiration that arbilration was intended to serve. it is now necessary to 
con ider the alignn1ent of class intere ts in the ffi'O countries and the patterns of their political 
art icu I ation. 
Holt ketches neatly the balance of forces that he sees operating in New .Zealand: 
The essence oflhe political situation which allowed con1pulsor)' arbitration to becon1e law 
in New Zealand in lS94 was that the unions. being industrially \\Cak. lacked the will to 
oppose it. while the ctnployers. being politically weak. lacked the power to prevent it (Holt 
1986. p. ? 5 ). 
Much of this is uncontentiou .l.hc \\'eaknes of the unions in the in11nediate a~tern1ath of 
the l\1aritinle Strike was such that they v.rere unlikely to purn the lifeline that Reeves threvl 
then1. Correspondingly. the en1ployers \Vere loath to give up their freedom of action at a tin1c 
v.hen they could unilaterally pre cribe wages and conditions. But in \vhat sense \Vere they 
politically \veak? Holt uggests three aspects. Fi~rst and 1110 t obviously. n1ost of thern \vere 
aligned \Vith the political opposition and con1n1anded lin1ited influence \Vithin the ruling 
Liberal adtnini tration. Second. they lacked organisation. In thi respect their victory in 1890 
had been too con1plete. for they had failed t.o n1aintain a peak hody and consequently were 
unable to n1obilise the popular support that n1ight have averted the Liberal victory in the 
election of 1893. Third. there was a conspicuous lack of unity between urban and rural 
cn1ployers. The fanners, \Vho \Vere \Veil represented in the Libc.:ral n1'inistry, \Vere placated by 
the reassurance that arbitration would be confined to the to\vns and in1ply left their urban 
counterparts to the·ir fate. (1-lolt. 1986. pp. 23-5, 45-9) 
Much Australian writing on union and en1ployer attitudes to the introduction of arbitra-
l ion runs on sitnilar lines. Macarthy and Rickard have described Australian unioni l turning 
to arbitration as a n1eans of securing outcotnes that they could not obtain by traditional 
bargaining procedures. They portray the en1ployers as generally oppo ed to arbitration in the 
flu h of their victory, but disunited and con equently ineffective in tht:ir opposition to the 
1nea ure. In particular. they explain hO\\ son1e e1nployers carne to ee advantages in the polic) 
ofNe\v Protection that linked \\age regulation and tariffs. and thus offered then1 protection 
again t itnports as " 'eli as cost-cutting do1nestiL con1petitors.2 
l1ere already is an interesting contrast with Nev.' Zealand: in one country it \vas the farn1ers 
" 'hose potential oppo ·ition " 'aS nl:utraliscd by exen1ption. in the other it \l/as the nlanufact-
urers \vhose accepta nee \Vas bought by protection. But n1ore recent work suggests the need for 
further qualifications. Etnployers played a rnuch n1orc active role than is con1n1only allo\vcd. 
for arbitration provided a sti 111 ulu s for the ere a tion of ne\V organisations \Vhich en1 barked on a 
ne\v scale of industrial and political activily. The proce scan be observed at the turn of the 
century when cornpuiSOI)' arbitration '"as introduced in NeVt' Sout.h Wales and \\' estern 
Australia. the Victorian \\'age board \\'ere extended and there \va the in1rninent creation oft he 
Con1nlOl1\\'ealth Arbitration Court. In re ponse to these dcveloptnent . the Victorian Ernploy-
cr ·Federation V.'a e tablished in 1902. the Ne\\' South \A/ales En1ployers· Federation in 1903 
and the ·Queensland counterpart in 1904.\ hen repre. entativcs fron1 the t: three States a \\ell 
a South Australia fonlled a Central Council of Ernplo) ers of Au tnllia to co-ordinate their 
efforts (Plovnnan 1986). 
Tht; ne\\' bodies had a dec i iv(.' in1pact on non-Labor politics- indeed George Reid. the 
leader oft he fed eral frce-t rade pa 1 t) . n1a de ani 111 n1cd iatc bid fort hci r support by I au nch i ng his 
celebrated 1905 crusade to extcrn1inate tht"' socialist tigcr.l "'hough J)cakin tried to n1aintain the 
independence of hi s prot·cction ist lib~rals. he C£H11e under increasing pn:ssure and in 1909 
2 :In fact the statutory link was brokt.:n \\hen the High Court struck do\\ n the provision oft he Exci:\C 
TariffAct on \\'hich Higgins based his Harve ter J udgen1e1H. but the connection het\\ ~en protc~tion 
and n1aintena nee of the basic wage rcrnai ned a political convention for the next hal f-ccntul) . 
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acccpt~d the inc' itablc fus ·ion of the non-Labor forces. Lihc;ralisnl \\as spent as an autono-
nlous force in Australian politics. its capacity lO innovate in the field of industrial relations at 
an end. In their in1n1ediatc intention to resist or r~strict art :tration. the en1ployers also had 
~con~iderablc !)Ucccss. Th~ Ne"' South Wales C~ou11 ''':' .. ~ ,unstrung by decisions handed dov.'n 
hy the Suprcn1c Court in response to actions brought hy the cn1ploycrs.lts \\'estern Au~tralian 
counterpart"' as sin1 ilct rly para lysed. At the federal level the cn1 ployers sa"' off Lahor·s a rbitra-
tion proposals. secured the n1or·e lin1itcd legislation oft he non-Lahor coalition. and thereafter 
cr~unpcd 'the efficacy oft he ("ourt 'by a scr ~ics of appeals to tht.! High c·ourt. )'ct by this tirne the 
Austral .ian t.!lllploy ~ers had nlO\'Cd fron1 their earlier rejection or arbitration to a n1orc llcxiblc 
strategy of containn1ent "h ich " 'as conditional on its contlitional acceptance. This bccan1c 
apparent in the period ofsrunn unddrang\\ hich raged on both sides oft he Tasrnan on the ·evc of 
the rir~t 'A1oriJ War. 
There arc cl.ear sin1ilarities in the circurnstanccs that produced lhe up urge of labour 
n1ilita ncy. Revived econon1ic gro\\ th and an upward n1ovcn1cnt of prices created nc"! \\age 
pressures. especially an1ong the less skilled and lo\\'er paid \\'Orkers. The tcn1po of econo:1nic 
change. the erosion of established \\'Ork practices and the irnposition of new forn1s of work 
discipline a .II fostered a nc\\' n1ilitan~y. which again \\'as particularly pronounced in industries 
cn1p'loying large groups ofn1anual \\'age-earners. Under these circun1stances the preference for 
collective bargaining. and the in1pat ·iencC\Vith the delays and constraints of arbitration. spilled 
over ·into bitter and protracted disputes. l~olt describes the " 'ave of s'lrikes that began in Nc\\' 
Zealand in 1906 and lasted until 1913 . . In Australia the first n1ajor slop page occurred at Broken 
Hill in 1909: over the next four years the turn1oi'l extended to the Ne\v South \\'a 'les coah11i ners 
and iron"orkers. transport \vorkcr in Queensland and \\1cstern Au tralia. the sugar \\'Orkers 
of northern Queensland and finally the Ne\\' South \\' ales gas\vorker . All of these dispute~ 
follO\\'Cd a sitni 'lar pattern of confronta'lion bet\\'een pickets and police lasting tnany v~eeks 
unlil one side yielded re1uctarrtly to the other ('Macintyre. 1986b~ pp. 113-21 ). 
l~hese dispules constituted an unprecedented test of arbitration in Au!Stralia as \\'ell as 'Ne" 
Zealand. The difference \Vas that Ne\v Zealand's Arbitration Act had been operating success-
fully for rnore than a decade before the ' .Red Feds· posed a cha'llcnge to tl}e Court " 'ith their 
po:licy of cance:lling registration to replace con1pulsory arbitration by collective bargaining. 
Holt·s narrative of the prior period ofindustrial peace sho~'S hO\\' arbitration had been n1ade to 
\vork in vlays that \Vent considerably beyond its original charter: ·The Arbitration Court had 
becon1e a tribunal charged not only v.ith resolving conflict hut \\'ith :fixing n1inirnurn \\ages, 
rnaxin1un1 hours and conditions of en1ployn1ent.. in ever-gro~ring areas of the private sector' 
(Holt 1986. p. 53). It did not a .l\\ay~ \\'Ork to the satisfaction of all parties but it con1n1anded 
acceptance: by international slandards Nev. Zealand was indeed a land \\ithout strikes. Holt 
a'lso idcn tifies the n1eans \Vhcreby the Court coped \\'ith the challenge issued by the 'Red Fed· 
union .. , notably 'the anti-strike provis·ions introduced in the 1908 atnendi ng legislation and the 
~~illingness lo recognise ahernativc unions. Ultin1ately. Holt argues. t.he episode reinforced 'the 
legitimacy of arbitration and helped reconcile en1ployers to it. 
In Au~Hralia the prospects ~'ere n1uch less propitious. Arbitration " 'as st.ill a ne\\' and 
i.rnperfcct instrun1cnt and n1any unions and en1ployers had still to be convinced of its benefits. 
The jurisdiction of the Co:n1n1onwcalth Arbitration Court \vas circun1scribed as a result of a 
series of High Court decisions. anJ Higgins· c·elebrated Harvester Judgen1ent had been struck 
dO\\'n to 'the chagrin of the labour n1ov~en1e.nt. 
Sorne of the n1ost drarnatic confrontations ,~·ere not strikes but lockouts. as in the Broken 
Hill di pute. or arose fron1 action takenagainsl union n1ernbcrs. as \Vith the Brisbane transpor'l 
worker whose victin1 isation triggered a general strike. In bot.h of these cases decisions in 
favour of the unions handed dov. n by Higgins as president of'the Con1n10n\veal'lh Arbitration 
Court v.ere challenged by the en1ploycrs and set aside: in these cases. as in olhers~ conservativ·e 
State gov~ernn1ents invoked discrin1inatory pO\\'ers to override arh·itral procedures and victi-
111 ise unionists. 
In the lighl of episodes such as these il seen1ed c'lear that the en1ploycrs· acceptance of 
arbitration \\~as n1erely expedient.l~hey " 'ere prepared to accept the decisions of State or federal 
tribunals when it suited then1 and to conden1n strikers for defying these tribunals~ but they fell 
no obligation to accept decisions t.hat went against then1. The un:ions exhibited the san1e 
attitude. The very basis oft he ne" pro vi nee for la\\' and order seen1ed in doubt Mean\vh ile 'the 
n1anifest fai 'lure ofLabor govern tnents to satisfy the expectations of unionists opened a breach 
bet\veen the political and indu~trial \\ ·ings of the labour n1oven1ent expressed in the popular 
rhyn1c: 
158 Stuart Macintyre 
I know the Arbitration Act 
As a sailor knows his "riggin · 
So if you want a srnall adva nee 
rll t.al k to Justice . iggins 
Bang n1e in to Pa rl iatnent 
B tun p 111 e a n y way 
Bang 1ne into Parliarncnt 
On next election day. 
Even so. arbitration survived. It survived as son1ething rather different from what its founders 
had intended- a tnechanisn1 for preventing industrial conflict- but it survived nevertheless. 
The reasons for its survival have no\vhere to n1y knowledge been adequately explained. but as a 
fir t step \Ve urgently need a narrative as clear and inforn1ative as that written by James Holt for 
Ne\v Zealand. 
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